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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2016, hundreds of residents of Africatown, Alabama, developed
harmful health problems, such as cancer, infertility, heart disease, and
adverse skin conditions.1 The Africatown residents later discovered that
Dioxins, Furans, and other related chemicals caused their health problems.2
The International Paper Company property, located a few miles from the
town, allegedly released these toxins, which contaminated the plaintiffs’ air,
soil, and water.3 In 2017, two hundred forty-eight individuals brought an
action against the International Paper Company and Bay Area Contracting,
Inc.4 The plaintiffs asserted twenty-three different state-law claims ranging
from trespass to assault.5 The plaintiffs sought compensatory damages for
personal injuries with punitive damages and injunctive relief.6 The
International Paper Company and Bay Area Contracting, Inc., filed a motion
to remove the action to federal court.7 The companies asserted the suit

1. Adams v. Int’l Paper Co., No. CV 17-0105-WS-B, 2017 WL 1828908, at *1 (S.D. Ala. May 5,
2017); Pl.’s Pet. for Damages and Injunctive Relief for Class Action Relief for All Similarly Situated
Persons at 14, Ashworth v. Int’l Paper Co., No. 2:20-cv-00053, 2020 WL 4043186 (W.D. La. Jan. 13,
2020), ECF No. 1.
2. Adams, 2017 WL 1828908, at *1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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qualified as a “mass action” under the mass action provision of the Class
Action Fairness Act (CAFA).8 Under this provision, a claim that qualifies
as a “mass action” is afforded a broad grant of federal jurisdiction upon
meeting minimal diversity requirements.9 However, the plaintiffs in Adams
v. International Paper Company,10 preferring to litigate in state court, submitted
a motion challenging the removal.11 The plaintiffs argued that even if their
claim qualified as a “mass action,” an exception to the mass action provision
applied, relieving their claim of federal jurisdiction under CAFA.12 This
exception is known as the “local single event exception.”13 Under this
exception, a mass action does not exist if “all of the claims in the action arise
from an event or occurrence in the State in which the action was filed, and
that allegedly resulted in injuries in that State or in States contiguous to that
State.”14 The defendants allege that the terms “event” or “occurrence”
constitute “a truly singular happening as opposed to an action for continuing
pollution over decades.”15 The plaintiffs argued the “event or occurrence”
language need not constitute a “truly singular happening” and can include a
claim of decade-long pollution.16 The district court spent the majority of
the opinion attempting to untangle the “event or occurrence” language of
the exception.17
This phenomenon is a common theme emerging from the local single
event exception.18 Recently, the Third, Ninth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits
have interpreted the vague language in CAFA’s local single event
8. Id at *1; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A).
9. Id.; see also Guyon Knight, The CAFA Mass Action Numerosity Requirement: Three Problems with
Counting to 100, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1875, 1877 (2010) (discussing the broad grant of federal
jurisdiction given to mass actions under CAFA).
10. Adams v. Int’l Paper Co., No. CV 17-0105-WS-B, 2017 WL 1828908 (S.D. Ala. May 5,
2017).
11. Id. at *2.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 634 (9th Cir. 2015) (referring to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) as the “local single event exception”).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I).
15. Adams, 2017 WL 1828908, at *6.
16. Id.
17. Id. at *5–8.
18. See Mallory A. Gitt, Removal Jurisdiction Over Mass Actions, 90 WASH. L. REV. 453, 454 (2015)
(“[T]he mass action provision has become the subject of intense litigation.”); see also Bonin v. Sabine
River Auth. of La., 961 F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2020) (examining conflicting interpretations of the
“event or occurrence” language of the local single event exception); RCHFU, L.L.C. v. Marriott
Vacations Worldwide Corp., No. 16-CV-01301-PAB-GPG, 2018 WL 1045164, at *2–3 (D. Colo.
Feb. 26, 2018) (interpreting the vague language in the local single event exception).
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exception.19 However, these circuits disagree on one interpretation,
thereby creating a three-way circuit split on the issue.20 This circuit split
has created confusion, inconsistent results, and many other issues for
litigants.21
This Comment will first discuss the history of the mass action and CAFA.
Second, this Comment will discuss and examine the various interpretations
adopted by the Third, Ninth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits. Lastly, this
Comment will propose a clear and uniform standard to guide courts in
applying local single event exceptions. Specifically, this Comment proposes
the adoption of the standard held by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.
II. HISTORY OF CLASS ACTIONS AND CAFA
A. Class Action History
Class actions are lawsuits aggregating the claims of numerous plaintiffs or
defendants.22 The legislature created class actions to prevent problems in
multiparty lawsuits, such as inconsistent outcomes and waste of economic
resources.23 Before enacting CAFA, the Advisory Committee on the
19. See Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P, 719 F.3d 270, 274 (3d Cir. 2013)
(discussing the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the “event or occurrence” language); Allen v. Boeing
Co., 784 F.3d 625, 628 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the “event or
occurrence” language); Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., 760 F.3d 405, 408
(5th Cir. 2014) (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the “event or occurrence” language);
Spencer v. Specialty Foundry Prods. Inc., 953 F.3d 735, 738–39 (11th Cir. 2020) (discussing the
Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the “event or occurrence” language).
20. See Abraham, 719 F.3d at 280(adopting a broad interpretation to the exception); Allen,
784 F.3d at 637 (adopting a narrow interpretation of the exception); Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., 760 F.3d
at 413 (adopting a reasonable interpretation of the exception); Spencer, 953 F.3d at 744 (adopting the
interpretation of the Fifth Circuit).
21. See Bonin, 961 F.3d at 386 (arguing the “event or occurrence” language does not apply to a
flooding incident causing damage in two different states); RCHFU, L.L.C., 2018 WL 1045164, at *2–
3 (concluding harms resulting from a “trading program” qualify as an “event” or “occurrence”).
22. See Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1332) (“Congress finds . . . [c]lass action lawsuits are an important and valuable part of the
legal system when they permit the fair and efficient resolution of legitimate claims of numerous parties
by allowing the claims to be aggregated into a single action against a defendant that has allegedly caused
harm.”); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions,
77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2002) (“A class action is simply . . . a state-created procedural
device . . . to provide closure and repose across the aggregated individual claims.”).
23. See Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 5 (“[S]tate and local courts are (A) keeping cases of national
importance out of Federal court; (B) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against out-ofState defendants; and (C) making judgments that impose their view of the law on other States and bind
the rights of the residents of those States.”); see also Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted Rule 23 (Rule 23) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to regulate multiparty lawsuits.24 Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil procedure has four prerequisites to class action
certification.25 The first condition requires the class to be “so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable . . . .”26 The second condition
requires the class to demonstrate “questions of law or fact common to the
class . . . .”27 The third condition requires the representative parties to have
claims or defenses “typical . . . of the class . . . .”28 The fourth condition
requires the representatives to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.”29 Unfortunately, the adoption of Rule 23 did little to resolve the
various problems resulting from class actions.30 These problems continued
until 2005, when Congress enacted CAFA to alleviate mass litigation
issues.31
(7th Cir. 1997) (“The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem
that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting
his or her rights.”); H. Hunter Twiford, III et al., CAFA’s New “Minimal Diversity” Standard for Interstate
Class Actions Creates a Presumption that Jurisdiction Exists, with the Burden of Proof Assigned to the Party Opposing
Jurisdiction, 25 MISS. C. L. REV. 7, 8 (2005) (discussing common problems of class actions before the
enactment of CAFA).
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also Russell Rapoport, Federal Rule 23 Class Actions: The Manageability
Problem, 4 SW. U. L. REV. 112, 112 (1972) (“The inherent complexities and rigidities
involved . . . proved inadequate, so the original federal device for permitting class actions was
redrafted . . . . The result was Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.”); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work
of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 390–
95 (1967) (discussing the history and purpose of Rule 23).
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
30. See Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions:
A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, INC., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 774 (1998) (“Although class actions have
the potential for leading to the efficient resolution of legal disputes, their deficiencies, even in the single
court setting, are well-known.”); Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance,
37 IND. L. REV. 65, 66 (2003) (“The form of governance provided by Rule 23, governance by
representative parties, is both vague in theory and ignored in practice.”).
31. See S. Rep. No. 109–14, at 5 (2005) (“By now, there should be little debate about the
numerous problems with our current class action system. A mounting stack of evidence reviewed by
the Committee demonstrates that abuses are undermining the rights of both plaintiffs and
defendants.”); Lahav, supra note 30, at 66 (proposing an “alternative regime of governance” for class
actions that solves the various problems of Rule 23); Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1594–95 (2006) (“CAFA, some six years in the
making, was originally directed at prominent abuses in class action practice such as unreadable notices
to class members and settlements that resulted in large fees to attorneys with little benefit to class
members.”).
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B. Diversity Jurisdiction of Class Actions Before CAFA
Prior to enacting CAFA, federal courts could not hear class action
lawsuits unless they qualified for either federal question jurisdiction or
complete diversity jurisdiction.32 However, many class actions do not
qualify for federal question jurisdiction, since they typically involve state law
claims.33 As such, complete federal diversity jurisdiction was the only
gateway to federal court for many class action lawsuits.34 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
limits “complete diversity jurisdiction” to cases involving “citizens of
different [s]tates,” where “the [amount] in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs . . . .”35 The “Complete
Diversity Standard” means that no plaintiff may be a citizen of the same
state as any of the defendants.36 Thus, federal diversity jurisdiction for class
actions required complete diversity and satisfaction of the amount-incontroversy requirement by each of the class members’ claims.37 Such
stringent requirements meant that many class actions did not qualify for

32. See Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294–95 (1973) (discussing the difficulties class
actions faced in establishing diversity jurisdiction before the adoption of CAFA); see also Twiford, III
et al., supra note 23, at 8 (“Among other things, CAFA amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which prior to
CAFA allowed for complete-diversity jurisdiction only.”).
33. Id.
34. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Consequences of CAFA: Challenges and Opportunities for the Just,
Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Class and Mass Actions, 13 SEDONA CONF. J. 181, 184 (2012)
(discussing how the majority of class actions looked to diversity jurisdiction to obtain access to federal
court); Twiford, III et al., supra note 23, at 12 (“Complete-diversity jurisdiction under section 1332(c)
historically has provided limited access to the federal courts for that small group of class actions whose
litigants met those jurisdictional requirements.”).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see also Grynberg v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 805 F.3d 901,
905 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity—no plaintiff may be a citizen
of the same state as any defendant.”); Twiford, III et al., supra note 23, at 8, 10 (discussing the complete
diversity standard).
36. See Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) (“[W]e have read the statutory
formulation ‘between . . . citizens of different States’ to require complete diversity between all plaintiffs
and all defendants.”); see Twiford, III et al., supra note 23, at 8 (comparing the complete diversity
standard to the minimal diversity standard); Grynberg, 805 F.3d at 905.
37. See Marc S. Werner, The Viability and Strategic Significance of Class Action Alternatives Under
CAFA’s Mass Action Provisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 465, 469 (“Prior to CAFA’s enactment, class actions
brought under state law . . . call[ed] for complete diversity (or the absence of any nondiverse named
parties) and the individual satisfaction of the amount-in-controversy requirement by the claims of each
class member.”); Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context:
A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1495 (2008) (“Because most tort law is state law, those
seeking to bring mass tort class actions in federal court are required to satisfy the requirements of
diversity jurisdiction.”).
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federal diversity jurisdiction.38 Further, the “Complete Diversity Standard”
was often manipulated by attorneys who preferred to litigate in state court.39
Congress sought to fix these problems and restore the “intent of the framers
of the United States Constitution” by expanding federal court access to
certain class actions.40 Congress established a minimal diversity standard
under CAFA and opened the federal courts to mass litigation lawsuits
unable to obtain federal diversity jurisdiction under the complete diversity
requirements of Section 1332.41
C. Diversity Jurisdiction After CAFA
CAFA was adopted in 2005 to ensure “fair and prompt recoveries for
class members with legitimate claims,” “restore the intent of [those who
drafted the] Constitution by [expanding] Federal court [jurisdiction over
interstate class actions],” and “benefit society by encouraging innovation
and lowering consumer prices.”42 CAFA defines a class action as “any civil
action filed under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar
38. See Twiford, III et al., supra note 23, at 8 (discussing how class actions lawsuits rarely
obtained federal diversity jurisdiction because of the stringent complete diversity standards).
39. See S. Rep. No. 109–14, at 10 (2005) (discussing how procedural rules had “the unintended
consequence of keeping most class actions out of federal court” and “enable[d] plaintiffs’ lawyers who
prefer to litigate in state courts to . . . avoid removal of large interstate class actions”); see also Twiford,
III et al., supra note 23, at 8 (“Congress drastically liberalized the inherent constraints under the
Complete Diversity Standard that previously prevented interstate class actions from being filed in, or
removed to, federal court.”); Jefferey L. Roether, Interpreting Congressional Silence: CAFA’s Jurisdictional
Burden of Proof in Post-Removal Remand Proceedings, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2745, 2745 (2007) (“According
to the Senate Judiciary Committee, abuses of the class action device by aggressive lawyers and lenient
state judges have ‘undermine[d] the national judicial system, the free flow of interstate commerce, and
the concept of diversity jurisdiction . . . .’”).
40. S. Rep. No. 109–14, at 29 (2005); see also Twiford, III et al., supra note 23, at 9 (“Among
other things, in Section 2 of the Act . . . Congress stated that prior abuses in class actions undermined
the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the Framers of the United States
Constitution . . . .”); Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1593, 1593 (2008) (“Congress dramatically expanded federal jurisdiction with the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005 (CAFA) . . . .”).
41. See Twiford, III et al., supra note 23, at 9 (“Congress intended to extend federal jurisdiction
over interstate class actions which, prior to CAFA’s enactment, could not be maintained in or removed
to federal court under the existing—and restrictive—Complete Diversity Standard.”); see also Cabraser,
supra note 34, at 1476 (“The admitted goal of congressional class action ‘reform’ is to save class actions
by destroying them as viable state court proceedings and transferring them . . . to the federal
system . . . .”).
42. S. Rep. No. 109–14, at 29 (2005); see also Twiford, III et al., supra note 23, at 9, 17 (“Also in
Section 2 of CAFA, Congress stated that one purpose of the Act is to ‘restore the intent of the framers
of the United States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of
national importance under diversity jurisdiction.’”).
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state statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought
by [one] or more representative persons . . . .”43 CAFA amended
Section 1332 to include Subsection D, which created the “minimal
diversity” standard.44 The “minimal diversity standard” gives federal courts
jurisdiction over class actions involving 100 or more individual class
members when the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.45
1.

Removal Jurisdiction Under CAFA

By expanding federal jurisdiction over class actions, CAFA also expanded
removal jurisdiction over class actions.46 Removal jurisdiction allows
litigants to remove a case from state court to federal court when the lawsuit
has original jurisdiction, either through diversity or federal question
jurisdiction.47 Before CAFA, litigants could not remove their cases to
federal court unless they met the stringent federal jurisdiction
requirements.48 Congress sought to amend this problem and prevent
lawyers from asserting claims against an in-state defendant to avoid
removal.49 CAFA’s new removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1453, makes removal
more accessible and allows the removal of a class action “without regard to
whether any defendant is a citizen of the State in which the action is
brought . . . .”50

43. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
44. Twiford, III et al., supra note 23, at 14.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
46. See Roether, supra note 39, at 2761 (“CAFA naturally expanded a class action defendant’s
opportunities to remove a state class action to federal court.”); Emery G. Lee III. & Thomas E.
Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and
Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1751 (2008) (discussing how “the number of diversity class actions
filed in or removed to federal courts” nearly doubled after the adoption of CAFA”); Cabraser, supra
note 34, at 189 (“28 U.S.C. § 1453 now provides for removal rights coextensive with the expanded
diversity jurisdiction rules . . . .”).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see also Sidney Powell & Deborah Pearce-Reggio, The Ins and Outs of
Federal Court: A Practitioner’s Guide to Removal and Remand, 17 MISS. C. L. REV. 227, 227 (1997)
(“In essence, § 1441(a) provides that a case may be removed from state to federal court only when it
could have been brought in federal court in the first place.”).
48. See Twiford, III et al., supra note 23, at 8 (discussing removal jurisdiction of class actions
before CAFA).
49. Roether, supra note 39, at 2761; see also Erichson, supra note 40, at 1593 (“CAFA . . . was
born amidst snide remarks about lawyers’ inventing lawsuits and manipulating the system to enrich
themselves at others’ expense.”).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b); see also Roether, supra note 39, at 2761 (“Therefore, CAFA now allows
the removal of a class action ‘in accordance with section 1446 . . . .’”).
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Mass Actions Under CAFA

CAFA further revolutionized mass litigation lawsuits by expanding
federal court access to include mass actions.51 Mass actions are non-class
aggregate litigation, that is, a “single lawsuit that encompasses claims or
defenses held by multiple parties or represented persons.”52 Congress
discovered that mass actions were “class actions in disguise[,]” since the
problems that CAFA intended to eliminate were also present in mass
actions.53 As such, Congress created the mass action provision of CAFA,
which deems a mass action a class action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A)
and is thus afforded a broad grant of federal jurisdiction.54 Further, since
CAFA classifies mass actions as class actions, CAFA naturally extends its
removal statute to mass actions.55 CAFA defines a mass action as “any civil
action [where] . . . [the] claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be
tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common
questions of law or fact . . . .”56
However, CAFA provides an exception to this provision.57 The
exception states that a mass action does not exist if “all of the claims in the
action arise from an event or occurrence in the State in which the action was
filed, and that allegedly resulted in injuries in that State or in States
contiguous to that state.”58 On meeting this exception, a lawsuit will lose
51. See Twiford, III et al., supra note 23, at 8 (discussing the addition to Section 1332(d) which
created the minimal diversity standard for class actions and mass actions); Knight, supra note 9, at 1877
(discussing CAFA’s mass action provision and the expansion of federal jurisdiction under the Act).
52. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02(a) (Proposed Final Draft
2009); see also Knight, supra note 9, at 1879 (“In simplest terms, aggregate litigation ‘is a single lawsuit
that encompasses claims or defenses held by multiple parties or represented persons.’”).
53. S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 47 (2005); see also Knight, supra note 9, at 1877 (“[A]ccording to
Congress, the evils inherent in class actions that CAFA hoped to eliminate were equally present in mass
actions.”).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A); see also Knight, supra note 9, at 1877 (“Congress’s prescription
for mass actions was the same that they applied to class actions: a broad grant of federal jurisdiction
over this breed of nonclass aggregate litigation.”); Linda S. Mullenix, Class Actions Shrugged: Mass Actions
and the Future of Aggregate Litigation, 32 REV. LITIG. 591, 607 (2013) (“[B]ecause state court mass actions
consolidated under joinder or other procedural mechanisms were viewed as masquerading class
actions, CAFA’s mass action provisions were intended to treat them as class actions for CAFA
purposes.”).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); see Mullenix, supra note 54, at 607 (“[M]ass actions were subjected to
CAFA’s class diversity jurisdiction requirements and were provided with a parallel removal
provision.”).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (2018).
57. Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I).
58. Id.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

9

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 3, Art. 4
853-881_VIELMA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

862

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

10/15/2022 1:24 PM

[Vol. 53:853

federal jurisdiction and be remanded to state court.59 This is the “local
single event exception,” which has created a split among the circuits as to
its proper application.60 Specifically, the critical language in the local single
event exception (“an event or occurrence”) has caused a dramatic circuit
split over what constitutes “an event or occurrence” justifying remand61
3.

Circuit Splits Generally

Circuit splits occur when federal courts “disagree about the answer to the
same legal question.”62 Courts generally disfavor circuit splits because they
cause wide-ranging issues, such as inconsistent outcomes, inequitable
results, and forum shopping.63 Recently, the Third, Ninth, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits created a three-way circuit split by disagreeing on how to
interpret the vague language in CAFA’s local single event exception.64

59. Id.
60. See Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P, 719 F.3d 270, 280 (3d Cir. 2013)
(establishing the Third Circuit interpretation of an “event or occurrence”); Nevada v. Bank of America,
672 F.3d 661, 668 (9th Cir. 2012) (establishing the Ninth Circuit interpretation of an “event or
occurrence”); Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2015) (confirming the Ninth Circuit
interpretation, created in Nevada v. Bank of America); Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore,
L.L.C., 760 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 2014) (establishing the Fifth Circuit interpretation of an “event or
occurrence”); Spencer v. Specialty Foundry Prods. Inc., 953 F.3d 735, 742–43 (11th Cir. 2020)
(establishing the Eleventh Circuit interpretation of an “event or occurrence”).
61. See Abraham, 719 F.3d at 280 (establishing the first interpretation of the “event or
occurrence” language); Allen, 784 F.3d at 630 (rejecting the interpretation of the Third Circuit); Rainbow
Gun Club, Inc., 760 F.3d at 408, (rejecting the interpretation of the Third and Ninth Circuit); Spencer,
953 F.3d at 742–43 (endorsing the interpretation of the Fifth Circuit).
62. Ruth A. Moyer, Disagreement About Disagreement: The Effect of a Circuit Split or “Other Circuit”
Authority on the Availability of Federal Habeas Relief for State Convicts, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 831, 831 (2014);
see also Jonathan M. Cohen & Daniel S. Cohen, Iron-ing out Circuit Splits: A Proposal for the Use of the Irons
Procedure to Prevent and Resolve Circuit Splits Among United States Courts of Appeals, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 989,
990 (2020) (defining circuit splits as “cases in which two or more courts of appeals have decided the
same legal issue differently”).
63. See Cohen & Cohen, supra note 62, at 990 (“Circuit splits undermine the uniformity,
consistency, and predictability of federal law.”); see also Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion,
31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982) (arguing uniform application of the law is “the most basic principle of
jurisprudence”).
64. See Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277 (adopting a broad interpretation to the exception); Allen,
784 F.3d at 630 (adopting a narrow interpretation of the exception); Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., 760 F.3d
at 409 (adopting a reasonable interpretation of the exception); Spencer, 953 F.3d at 742–43 (adopting
the interpretation of the Fifth Circuit).
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III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Group: A Third Circuit Interpretation
In Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Group,65 more than 450 residents of
the island of St. Croix brought suit against St. Croix Renaissance Group
(SCRG), the owner of an alumina refinery.66 The plaintiffs alleged that
SCRG’s failure to properly store hazardous industrial byproducts on the site
over a period of ten years caused the plaintiffs’ injuries and property
damages.67 SRG removed the lawsuit to federal court by claiming federal
diversity jurisdiction under the mass action provision of CAFA.68 The
plaintiffs moved to remand their case to state court, claiming that the district
court lacked federal subject-matter jurisdiction because the local single event
exception precluded the suit from the definition of a “mass action.”69
The Third Circuit gave the words “event” or “occurrence” their ordinary
meaning.70 The court held that neither “event” nor “occurrence” is used
solely to refer to a “specific incident that can be definitively limited to an
ascertainable period of minutes, hours, or days.”71 The court reasoned the
words “event” and “occurrence” do not commonly refer to an isolated
moment in time.72 Therefore, there is no reason to conclude that Congress
intended to limit the phrase “event or occurrence” in
Section 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) to something that happened at a discrete
moment in time.73 Ultimately, the Third Circuit held, for purposes of the
local single event exclusion, an event or occurrence constitutes
“circumstances that share some commonality and persist over a period of
time.”74

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P, 719 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 273.
Id.
Id. at 273, 275.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 277.
Id.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 277–78.
Id. at 277.
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B. Nevada v. Bank of America and Allen v. The Boeing Company:
A Ninth Circuit Interpretation
In Nevada v. Bank of America,75 the State of Nevada filed a parens patriae
lawsuit against Bank of America Corporation for allegedly violating the
Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act by misleading consumers about the
“terms and operation of its home mortgage modification and foreclosure
processes . . . .”76 Nevada also alleged that Bank of America violated an
existing consent judgment from a prior case between the parties.77 Bank of
America removed the case to federal district court, claiming federal subject
matter jurisdiction under the “mass action” provision of CAFA.78 This
court held that the “event or occurrence” exception “applies only where all
claims arise from a single event or occurrence.”79 Since this case involved
widespread fraud in thousands of borrower interactions, the court held that
the action did not come within the “event or occurrence” exception.80
Three years later, in Allen v. The Boeing Company,81 plaintiffs sued The
Boeing Company (Boeing) and Landau Associates (Landau) in state court,
alleging that “Boeing released toxins into the groundwater around its
facility” for over forty years.82 The plaintiffs further alleged Landau was
“negligent in its investigation and remediation of the pollution” for over a
decade.83 Boeing removed to federal district court, alleging federal
jurisdiction based on diversity and the “mass action” provision of CAFA
§ 1332(d)(11)(B).84 “The district court remanded the case to state court
holding that (1) Landau was not fraudulently joined, and thus there was not
complete diversity, and (2) Plaintiffs’ action came within the local single
event exception[,]” thus revoking federal jurisdiction85

75. Nevada v. Bank of America, 672 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2012).
76. Id. at 664.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 664–65.
79. Id. at 668 (emphasis in original); see also Lafalier v. Cinnabar Serv. Co., Inc., 2010 WL
1486900, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 13, 2010) (“[C]ourts have consistently construed the ‘event or
occurrence’ language to apply only in cases involving a single event or occurrence, such as an
environmental accident, that gives rise to the claims of all plaintiffs.”).
80. Nevada, 672 F.3d at 670.
81. Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2015).
82. Id. at 627.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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In Allen, the Ninth Circuit declined to follow the Third Circuit’s
definition of “event or occurrence” as stated in Abraham.86 The Allen court
stated several reasons for straying from the Abraham interpretation and
adopting the interpretation of Nevada.87 First, the court held that the terms
“event” or “occurrence” normally refer to a singular happening.88 Second,
the Allen court stated that giving “event or occurrence” a broader definition
is inconsistent with the overall structure of CAFA.89 The Allen court
ultimately held that the “exception would apply only to a truly local single event with
no substantial interstate effects.”90
C. Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C.: A Fifth Circuit
Interpretation
In Rainbow Gun Club, Inc, v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C.,91 one hundred sixtyseven plaintiffs entered into oil, gas, and mineral leases with Denbury
Onshore that allowed Denbury to explore for oil, gas, and hydrocarbons.92
The plaintiffs brought suit in Louisiana state court, alleging that Denbury
had breached its duty to act as a reasonable operator of the well by allowing
water to enter the gas reservoir, thus reducing the productivity of the well.93
Denbury removed to federal court under the mass action provision of
CAFA.94 However, the district court found the plaintiffs’ claims arose from
an “event or occurrence” and met all other requirements of the local single
event exception, thus, precluding federal jurisdiction.95
Denbury appealed, arguing that the local single event exception only
applied to events that occur at a “discrete moment in time.”96 The court of
appeals recognized that the statute’s language, its legislative history, the
ordinary meaning of the terms, and the Third Circuit’s compelling analysis
in Abraham supported the plaintiff’s proposition that the single event or
occurrence need not occur at a discrete moment in time.97 The court
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 630.
Id.
Id. at 631.
Id.
Id. at 632 (emphasis in original).
Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., 760 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 407.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 412.
Id.
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ultimately found an “event or occurrence” can be defined by “a pattern of
conduct in which the pattern is consistent in leading to a single focused
event that culminates in the basis of the asserted liability.”98
D. Spencer v. Specialty Foundry Products Inc.: An Eleventh Circuit
Interpretation
In Spencer v. Specialty Foundry Products Inc.,99 two hundred thirty plaintiffs
worked at the Grede Foundry in Bessemer, Alabama.100 Plaintiffs claimed
the defendant exposed them to hazardous chemicals released and formed at
the foundry.101 The foundry went out of business, so plaintiffs filed suit
against ten defendants who “manufactured, sold, supplied, and distributed
the products” the plaintiffs believe harmed them.102 “One defendant
removed the case to federal court, citing the” mass action provision of
CAFA as the basis for removal.103 The “[p]laintiffs moved to remand the
case back to state court[,]” arguing that the local single event exception
applied because the harm caused by the defendants “was a continuing tort
located solely within the foundry.”104 The district court “granted their
motion, finding that the [p]laintiffs’ action falls within the local single event
exception of CAFA[] . . . .”105 The defendants appealed, arguing that the
local single event exception “applies to only events or occurrences that take
place at a singular moment in time[,]” and that plaintiffs’ claims were too
“disparate and disconnected” to qualify.106
The Spencer court viewed the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the
exception as “too cramped.”107 Instead, the Spencer court agreed with the
Third and Fifth Circuits that the plain meanings of “event” and
“occurrence” is “not generally understood to apply only to incidents that
occur at a discrete moment in time.”108 However, the court refused to
adopt the Third Circuit interpretation in Abraham, reasoning that the
“Third Circuit’s analysis would benefit from guardrails for applying the local
98.
99.
100.
101
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Spencer v. Specialty Foundry Products Inc., 953 F.3d 735 (11th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 737.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 737, 739.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 742.
Id.
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[single] event exception.”109 The court preferred the interpretation adopted
by the Fifth Circuit in Rainbow Gun Club, which requires “the defendants’
actions to be contextually connected and to culminate in one, distinct harmcausing event or occurrence . . . .”110 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation is “best equipped to decide which cases are
truly local and which should remain in federal court.”111
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that “‘an event or occurrence’ refers to
a series of connected, harm-causing incidents that culminate in one event or
occurrence giving rise to plaintiffs’ claims.”112 Therefore, the court held
that “[b]ecause the Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege a continuous, related
course of conduct culminating in one harm-causing event or occurrence, it
does not fall within the local event exception.”113
1.

Impact of the Circuit Split and a Need for Resolution

The three-way split created by the Third, Fifth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits’ interpreting the “event” or “occurrence” language from
the local single event exception has caused many negative impacts for
litigants.114 First, the split creates a lack of coherence in applying the
exception and has created confusion for litigants and attorneys.115 Since
only four circuits have weighed in on the issue, other circuits will eventually
adopt one of the four established interpretations or create their own.
Litigants in these circuits will face uncertainty in their claims and will not
know if they are entitled to federal jurisdiction until the respective circuit
adopts an interpretation.116
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 743.
112. Id. at 740.
113. Id. at 744.
114. See Kirsten Z. Myers, Removing the Mass Misperception: A Consideration of Mass Environmental
Torts and Removal Jurisdiction Under the Class Action Fairness Act, 51 VAL. U. L. REV. 161, 186 (2016)
(“A vague standard for removal jurisdiction, under the CAFA, aggravates many policy areas of tort law
by failing to use liability as a means to deter accidents.”) (citation omitted).
115. See Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1198 (11th Cir. 2007) (“CAFA’s mass action
provisions present an opaque, baroque maze of interlocking cross-references that defy easy
interpretation . . . .”); Bonin v. Sabine River Auth. of La., 961 F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2020) (describing
the confusion litigants faced in applying the local single event exception); RCHFU, LLC v. Marriott
Vacations Worldwide Corp., No. 16-CV-01301-PAB-GPG, 2018 WL 1045164, at *2
(D. Colo. Feb. 26, 2018) (demonstrating conflicting arguments by litigants in interpreting the “event
or occurrence” language of the local single event exception).
116. See RCHFU, L.L.C., 2018 WL 1045164, at *2 (exploring conflicting arguments among
litigants in a circuit that has not adopted an interpretation of the “event or occurrence” language in the
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Secondly, this circuit split potentially upsets the balance of power
between federal and state courts.117 CAFA sought to create broader federal
jurisdiction for class actions that were traditionally brought in federal courts
under state law theories while ensuring fairness and prompt recoveries for
all parties.118 However, the circuit split has denied defendants access to
federal court by forcing claims back to state court if the exception
applies.119 A clear and defined test for determining an “event or
occurrence” would benefit courts and litigants by diminishing
inconsistencies in applying the law and reducing the amount of time parties
and courts spend trying to decipher which interpretation to apply.120
Third, this circuit split encourages forum shopping.121 Vague legislation,
like that of the local single event exception, encourages parties to remand a
lawsuit from federal court to state court to potentially achieve more
favorable treatment.122 Forum shopping violates the legislative intent of
CAFA because Congress adopted the exception to keep certain cases in
federal courts.123 Resolving the circuit split will prevent forum shopping
because parties will be less likely to artfully plead their way into a favorable
court.124
local single event exception); see also Moyer, supra note 62, at 831–36 (discussing how confusion by
litigants is among the common problems caused by circuit splits).
117. See Cohen & Cohen, supra note 62, at 997 (discussing the problems circuit splits pose on
federal and state courts); Gitt, supra note 18, at 456 (“[T]he mass action provision . . . also implicate[s]
fundamental values in our judicial system: the boundaries of power between the state and federal
courts . . . .”).
118. S. Rep. No. 109–14, at 29 (2005); see also Burbank, supra note 37, at 1443 (“The statute’s
stated purposes are to . . . assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members with legitimate claims.”).
119. See Cohen & Cohen, supra note 62, at 997 (discussing how circuit splits deny litigants access
to federal court); see also RCHFU, L.L.C., 2018 WL 1045164, at *3 (demonstrating a loss of federal
jurisdiction by the application of the local single event exception).
120. Gerald Bard Tjoflat, The Federal Judiciary: A Scarce Resource, 27 CONN. L. REV. 871, 874
(1995) (“But when the law is unstable, the parties cannot know what to expect . . . the parties can
neither accurately nor confidently predict the outcome of a judicial resolution of the dispute . . . . ”).
121. See Cohen & Cohen, supra note 62, at 997 (discussing how circuits splits can lead to forum
shopping); Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth Amendment,
65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1183 (2012) (discussing how “enablement of ‘forum shopping among circuits’
was one of the four concerns singled out by the Federal Courts Study Committee in 1990 when
assessing if a circuit split was ‘intolerable’”).
122. See Cohen & Cohen, supra note 62, at 990 (“The issue of circuit splits has been so widely
regarded as a threat to the fair and consistent distribution of justice that it has been the focus of
numerous reform efforts.”).
123. 151 CONG. REC. S1076–01 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Senator Dodd).
124. See Cohen & Cohen, supra note 62, at 997–98 (“One consequence of the fragmentation of
federal law from circuit splits is forum shopping, which has been criticized as unfair.”).
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A clear standard to evaluate what constitutes an “event or occurrence”
would benefit the courts of different jurisdictions by providing judges with
one coherent standard to apply when adjudicating removal jurisdiction for
mass actions.125 A clear standard would also diminish the inconsistent
results across the circuits, thereby reducing uncertainty for judges and
parties.126 Further, a clear standard would also help reduce the amount of
time courts spend in evaluating which standard to adopt and will enable a
court to arrive at a decision swiftly.127
In addition, circuit splits often prevent parties from predicting how a
judge will rule on a specific case.128 Unpredictable results encourage parties
to proceed in lengthy lawsuits and reduce the chances of settlement.129
However, a clear and uniform standard will allow parties to weigh the
likelihood and potential outcome of removing their case to federal court.130
Parties may be more willing to settle if they know that their claim will not
be heard in the court that is more favorable. Increased settlements will
naturally save litigants and courts time and money.

125. See Mark Latham et al., The Intersection of Tort and Environmental Law: Where the Twains Should
Meet and Depart, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 737, 740–45 (2011) (discussing how different standards in tort
litigation cause circuit splits because judges look at similar facts under different lenses of interpretation);
see also Tjoflat, supra note 120, at 873 (“The clarity and stability of the rule of law . . . depends on the
number of judges pronouncing the rule.”).
126. See Latham et al., supra note 125, at 740–45 (discussing how uniform interpretations often
resolve problems created in tort litigation circuit splits); Michael Duvall, Resolving Intra-Circuit Splits in
the Federal Courts of Appeal, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 17, 18–19, 21–23 (2009) (advocating for the resolution
of circuit splits); Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court
Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (1994) (“Both the Constitution’s framers and the Supreme Court
have stressed that the articulation of nationally uniform interpretations of federal law is an important
objective of the federal adjudicatory process.”).
127. See Wyatt G. Sassman, How Circuits Can Fix Their Splits, 103 MARQ. L. REV. 1401, 1438
(2020) (“[M]andating uniformity within a circuits’ decisions encourages stability, predictability, and
fairness to litigants.”); see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Cleaning up the Environmental Liability Insurance Mess,
27 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 602–03 (1993) (arguing uniform standards often render faster court decisions).
128. See Evan Bernick, The Circuit Splits Are Out There—and the Court Should Resolve Them,
16 ENGAGE 36, 37 (2015) (discussing how circuit splits create uncertainty among litigants).
129. Tjoflat, supra note 120, at 873 (“But when the law is unstable, the parties cannot know what
to expect . . . . [T]he parties can neither accurately nor confidently predict the outcome of a judicial
resolution of the dispute . . . .”).
130. See Logan, supra note 121, at 1142 (advocating for the resolution of circuit splits to reduce
confusion among litigants); see also Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 631 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir.
2011) (interpreting the vague language of the local single event exception and showing conflicting
interpretations from the litigants).
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IV. ADOPTING A SINGLE INTERPRETATION
A. Statutory Interpretation
In statutory construction cases, courts must first review the text of the
statute.131 If the text of the statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no
need for further inquiry.132 However, if the text is not plain and if the
statute does not provide guidance to interpret the statute, courts must look
at the ordinary meaning of the text.133 To determine the ordinary meaning,
courts “often look to dictionary definitions for guidance.”134 Because the
statute does not define “an event or occurrence,” we must look to dictionary
definitions to decipher the ordinary meaning.135
1.

Ordinary Meaning of Words

Several general and legal dictionaries support the broader interpretation
of “event or occurrence” adopted by the Third, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits.136 For instance, the Merriam–Webster’s Dictionary defines
an “occurrence” as an “action or fact of happening.”137 Similarly, Black’s
Law Dictionary defines “occurrence” as “something that occurs” or
“something that happens or takes place,” including a “continuing condition

131. Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013).
132. Roth v. Norfalco, L.L.C., 651 F.3d 367, 379 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Robinson v. Shell Oil
Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (“Our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and
‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’”) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.,
489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)).
133. Barton v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 904 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2018); see also United States v.
Diallo, 575 F.3d 252, 256–57 (3d Cir. 2009) (looking at the ordinary meaning of specific words to
determine the scope of a statute); BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006) (“Unless
otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary
meaning.”).
134. In re Walter Energy, Inc., 911 F.3d 1121, 1143 (11th Cir. 2018); see also CBS Inc. v.
PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1223 (11th Cir. 2001) (using the dictionary definition of
the word “termination” to uncover its ordinary meaning).
135. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) (demonstrating vague language within the local
single event exception).
136. Event,
AHDICTIONARY,
https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=event
[https://perma.cc/Y9T3-C5E4]; Event, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/event
[https://perma.cc/8SCY-8H3F];
Occurrence,
AHDICTIONARY,
https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=occurrence
[https://perma.cc/2TKV-GNT6];
Occurrence,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/occurrence
[https://perma.cc/V64D-REJ3]; Occurrence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
137. Occurrence,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
occurrence [https://perma.cc/V64D-REJ3].

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss3/4

18

Vielma: Inter-Circuit Judicial Splits Surrounding the Class Action Fairne
853-881_VIELMA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

10/15/2022 1:24 PM

COMMENT

871

that results in personal injury or property damage.”138 As for an “event,”
the Merriam–Webster’s Dictionary and The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language commonly refer to it as something that “happens” or “takes
place.”139 Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, none of the
dictionaries examined contain language limiting the “event” or “occurrence”
to something happening at a single or discrete moment in time.140
2.

Legislative History

Courts can also look to the legislative history when interpreting a
statute.141 The use of legislative history in statutory interpretation is to
“ascertain the intent of legislative authority.”142 Courts can look at the
legislative history of a statute only when the text of the statute is
“ambiguous.”143 The language of the statute may be ambiguous if it is
138. Occurrence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
139. Event,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/event
[https://perma.cc/8SCY-8H3F];
Event,
AHDICTIONARY,
https://ahdictionary.com/word/
search.html?q=event [https://perma.cc/Y9T3-C5E4].
140. See Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e are constrained to read
[the exception] as referring to a single happening because this definition . . . reflects the most common
understanding of the terms . . . .”).
But see Event, AHDICTIONARY, https://ah
dictionary.com/word/search.html?q=event [https://perma.cc/Y9T3-C5E4] (defining “event” as
“something that takes place, especially a significant occurrence”); Event, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/event [https://perma.cc/8SCY-8H3F] (defining
“event” as “something that happens,” “occurrence,” and “a noteworthy happening”); Occurrence,
AHDICTIONARY,
https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=occurrence
[https://perma.cc/2TKV-GNT6] (defining “occurrence” as “[t]he action, fact, or instance of
occurring” and as “something that takes place; an event or incident”); Occurrence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/occurrence
[https://perma.cc/V64D-REJ3]
(defining “occurrence” as “something that occurs” or “the action or instance of occurring”); Occurrence,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “occurrence” as “[s]omething that happens or
takes place”).
141. See In re Hammers, 988 F.2d 32, 34 (5th Cir.1993) (discussing how courts may look to the
legislative history so long as the statutory terms are ambiguous); see also Reed Dickerson, Statutory
Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1131 (1983) (“It is currently
fashionable among jurisprudes to approve or condone the selective use of legislative history in
determining the meaning of statutes.”); Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruction,
11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 43, 47 (1988) (“[L]egislative history can also serve to overcome some
Congressional shortcomings.”).
142. See Hammers, 988 F.2d 32, 34 (5th Cir.1993) (“The sole purpose of statutory construction
including, when appropriate, a review of all available legislative history, is to ascertain the intent of the
legislative authority.”); see also Hatch, supra note 141, at 43 (“[L]egislative history, properly applied, can
have great value in the interpretive process.”).
143. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (“Extrinsic
materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the
enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.”).
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“reasonably susceptible to different interpretations.” 144 If a statute appears
ambiguous, our search may extend the text of the statute because statutory
interpretation focuses on “the language itself, the specific context in which
that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”145
This statute appears ambiguous, as evidenced by conflicting interpretations
of the “event” or “occurrence” language by the Third, Fifth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits.146 Accordingly, we must consider the local single event
exception’s legislative history to determine Congress’s intent in passing the
Act.147
The Third and Eleventh Circuits refused to consider the legislative history
to guide their interpretation because they interpreted the text of the local
single event exception to be unambiguous.148 However, the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits examined the legislative history because they held that some
ambiguity exists.149 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits examined the Senate
144. Edwards v. A.H. Cornel l& Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2010).
145. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341 (1997) (“The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is
determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and
the broader context of the statute as a whole.”).
146. See Moyer, supra note 62, at 839 (“[S]ome federal courts have concluded that a circuit split
may establish ambiguity in the text of a federal statute.”); Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 372
(5th Cir. 2011) (“Where no controlling authority specifically prohibits a defendant’s conduct, and when
the federal circuit courts are split on the issue, the law cannot be said to be clearly established.”); Abrego
Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Meshing the existing jurisdiction and
removal statutory sections with the CAFA ‘mass action’ amendments is far from straightforward.”); see
also Nevada v. Bank of America, 672 F.3d 661, 668 (9th Cir. 2012) (arguing the exception is constrained
to an event that occurs at a discrete moment in time); Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir.
2015) (adopting the interpretation of Nevada); Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P,
719 F.3d 270, 280 (3d Cir. 2013) (arguing the exception need not be constrained to a discrete moment
in time); Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., 760 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 2014)
(agreeing with the Third Circuit’s in that an “event” or occurrence” need not be constrained to a
discrete moment in time but disagreeing with the interpretation that the Third Circuit adopted);
Spencer v. Specialty Foundry Prods. Inc., 953 F.3d 735, 742 (11th Cir. 2020) (adopting the
interpretation of the Fifth Circuit in Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore).
147. See Mullenix, supra note 54, at 611 (discussing how the legislative history may help reveal
the congressional intent behind the mass action provision).
148. See Spencer, 953 F.3d at 741 (“While the District Court is not the only court to rely on
CAFA’s Senate Report when interpreting the local event exception, we do not believe this is necessary
because the text of the local event exception is clear.”); Abraham, 719 F.3d at 278–79 (“[T]here is no
reason to consider the legislative history of the CAFA to interpret the phrase ‘event or occurrence’ in
the mass-action exclusion.”).
149. See Rainbow Gun Club, 760 F.3d at 410 (“Here, at least some ambiguity exists in the scope
of the terms ‘event’ and ‘occurrence,’ as evidenced by the district court decisions cited by the parties.
Accordingly, we consider the relevant legislative history to shed light on the intent of Congress in
passing the local single event exclusion.”); Allen, 784 F.3d at 630 (“We find that such a broad definition
renders portions of CAFA redundant and is not supported by legislative history.”).
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report and the congressional record to discern Congress’s intent in adopting
the exception.150 The congressional report reveals that one of the proposed
forms of CAFA restricted the local single event exception to cases in which
the plaintiffs’ claims arose from a “single sudden accident.”151 However,
Congress rejected this proposed form of exception.152 Instead, Congress
enacted a version of CAFA that expanded the “single sudden accident
exception” to include cases which arise from an “event or occurrence.”153
This congressional report demonstrates that Congress refused to constrain
the exception to an “event” or “occurrence” that only happened at a single
moment in time. This legislative history supports the proposition that
Congress intended courts to follow the ordinary meaning of the terms
“event” or “occurrence,” and that such terms are not constrained to a
singular happening.
B. Criticism of Third Circuit Interpretation
The Third Circuit in Abraham reasonably held that the terms “event” and
“occurrence” should not be constrained to a single happening.154 While
this claim is supported by the ordinary meaning of the terms155 and
150. See Rainbow Gun Club, 760 F.3d at 410 (“In one of its prior proposed forms, the local single
event exclusion would have applied only to cases in which the plaintiffs’ claims arose from a ‘single
sudden accident.’”); Allen, 784 F.3d at 629 (“Moreover, the legislative history of CAFA supports this
interpretation, making clear that the exception was intended to apply ‘only to a truly local single event
with no substantial interstate effects.’”).
151. 151 CONG. REC. S1076–01 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Senator Dodd); see
Dickerson, supra note 141, at 1131 (“Committee reports are the second most reliable kind of legislative
history. Their main value is in showing (if they do) the ulterior purposes that the respective bills are
intended to advance.”).
152. 151 CONG. REC. S1076-01 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Senator Dodd).
153. See id. (“The compromise expands the ‘single sudden accident’ exception so that federal
jurisdiction shall not exist over mass actions in which all claims arise from any ‘event or occurrence’
that happened in the state where the action was filed and that allegedly resulted in injuries in that state
or in a contiguous state.”).
154. See Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P, 719 F.3d 270, 277 (3d Cir. 2013) (“In
common parlance, neither the term ‘event’ nor ‘occurrence’ is used solely to refer to a specific incident
that can be definitively limited to an ascertainable period of minutes, hours, or days.”).
155. See Event, AHDICTIONARY, https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=event
[https://perma.cc/Y9T3-C5E4] (refusing to constrain the definition of “event” to a singular
happening); Event, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/event
[https://perma.cc/8SCY-8H3F] (defining “event” as something that need not happen at a singular
moment in time); Occurrence, AHDICTIONARY, https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?
q=occurrence [https://perma.cc/2TKV-GNT6] (defining “occurrence” as “the . . . instance of
occurring”); Occurrence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
occurrence [https://perma.cc/V64D-REJ3] (defining “occurrence” as a circumstance that is broad
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legislative history of the Act,156 the Third Circuit adopted an approach that
is too inclusive.157 Specifically, the Third Circuit held for purposes of the
local single event exclusion, an event or occurrence constitutes
“circumstances that share some commonality and persist over a period of
time.”158 Under this approach, an “event or occurrence” can constitute
multiple events, since many events are capable of sharing “some
commonality and persist over a period of time.”159 By not specifying what
constitutes “some commonality,” and by not limiting the time frame
between the start and end of a circumstance, the Abraham court’s
interpretation broadens the scope of the exception.160 The Fifth Circuit in
Spencer depicts the level of inclusiveness under the Third Circuit
interpretation.161 The Spencer court explains that two baseball games
involving the same team, but taking place years apart, could be interpreted
as an “event or occurrence” under the Third Circuit interpretation, since
they “involve the same team playing the same sport[,]” thereby sharing some
commonality and persisting over a period of time.162
However, the legislative history of CAFA clearly states that Congress
intended the local single event exception to apply to a limited number of
cases.163 The legislative history also reveals Congress intended the words

enough to include “the instance of occurring”); Occurrence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(defining “occurrence” also as a “continuing condition that results in personal injury or property
damage”).
156. See 151 CONG. REC. S1076–01 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Senator Dodd)
(discussing how Congress refused to adopt an interpretation limited to a “single sudden accident”);
see also Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277 (“Giving the words ‘event’ or ‘occurrence’ their ordinary meaning is
not at odds with the purpose of the statutory scheme of CAFA.”).
157. See Rainbow Gun Club, 760 F.3d at 410 (refusing to adopt the interpretation of the Third
Circuit and proposing their own narrower interpretation); Spencer, 953 F.3d at 741 (criticizing the
interpretation of the Third Circuit).
158. Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277.
159. See id. (asserting an event may be “of a continuing nature”); see also Spencer, 953 F.3d at 778
(urging for “guardrails” to constrain the Third Circuit’s analysis).
160. Spencer, 953 F.3d at 742 (“At the same time, the Third Circuit’s analysis would benefit from
guardrails for applying the single local event exception.”).
161. Id. at 741.
162. Id.
163. 151 CONG. REC. S1076–01 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Senator Dodd); see also
Myers, supra note 114, at 196 (“[A] broad approach goes directly against the legislative intent of the
CAFA because the CAFA sets out multiple exceptions and a broad interpretation of the same event
or occurrence diminishes the value of those exceptions.”).
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“event or occurrence” to serve as words of limitation.164 As such, a broad
approach contradicts the legislative intent of the exception because a broad
interpretation of an “event or occurrence” broadens the application of the
exception.165 Accordingly, the Third Circuit’s approach is too broad to
properly advance the Congressional intent in adopting the local single event
exception.166
C. Criticism of Ninth Circuit Interpretation
The Ninth Circuit approach holds that an “event or occurrence” only
exists when “all claims arise from a single event or occurrence.”167 Although
this approach ensures all mass action claims arising out of truly singular
happenings are remanded to state courts, it is too narrow for purposes of
CAFA.168 The congressional report reveals that Congress rejected a
proposed form of CAFA that restricted the local single event exception to
cases in which the plaintiffs’ claims arose from a “single sudden
accident.”169 Instead, Congress enacted a version of CAFA that expanded
the exception.170 This congressional report demonstrates that Congress
refused to constrain the exception to an “event” or “occurrence” that
happened at a single moment in time.171 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit
argues the legislative intent of the exception is a narrowly construed
standard because states have an interest in adjudicating issues where the

164. 151 CONG. REC. S1076–01 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Senator Dodd); see also
Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277 (“Congress clearly contemplated that some mass actions are better suited to
adjudication by the state courts in which they originated.”).
165. 151 CONG. REC. S1076–01 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Senator Dodd); see Allen
v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We find that such a broad definition renders portions
of CAFA redundant and is not supported by legislative history.”).
166. See Myers, supra note 114, at 196 (proposing a new interpretation of the local single event
exception which narrows the interpretation of the Third Circuit); Spencer v. Specialty Foundry Prods.
Inc., 953 F.3d 735, 742 (11th Cir. 2020) (discussing how the Third Circuit’s interpretation could use
some “guardrails”).
167. Nevada v. Bank of America, 672 F.3d 661, 668 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Allen, 784 F.3d
at 633 (agreeing with the interpretation in Nevada).
168. See Myers, supra note 114, at 176 (discussing how the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation is too
narrow).
169. 151 CONG. REC. S1076–01 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Senator Dodd).
170. Id.
171. Id.; see also Myers, supra note 114, at 195 (“When examining the legislative intent of the
CAFA, the drafters did not want an approach for removal jurisdiction of mass actions to be too broad
or too narrow.”).
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source and harm arise in the same place.172 While this argument holds
merit, the Ninth Circuit’s narrow view contradicts the legislative intent
because their standard would only apply to cases where the “event or
occurrence” happened at a single and discrete moment in time.173 This
approach would weaken a state court’s power to hear truly localized claims
and harms because the exception would not apply to truly localized claims
that happened beyond a discrete moment in time. Under the Ninth Circuit
interpretation, a multi-day happening, such as a flooding, hurricane, or
wildfire will not fall under the exception, even if it is a truly localized
happening.
Further, the Ninth Circuit interpretation contradicts several general and
legal definitions of the words “event” or “occurrence.”174 None of the
popular general and legal definitions examined by the Ninth, Fifth, Third,
and Eleventh Circuits, contain language limiting the “event” or
“occurrence” to something happening at a single moment in time.175 In
contrast, all the definitions examined by the courts support a broader

172. See Nevada, 672 F.3d at 668 (stating the exception is narrowly construed to certain
occurrences); see also Allen, 784 F.3d at 633 (arguing the legislative intent of the exception is a narrow
one).
173. See Nevada, 672 F.3d at 668 (confining the event or occurrence to a discrete moment in
time); Allen, 784 F.3d at 633 (adopting the narrow interpretation of Nevada).
174. See
Event, AHDICTIONARY,
https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=event
[https://perma.cc/Y9T3-C5E4] (defining “event” as “something that takes place, especially a
significant occurrence”); Event, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/event [https://perma.cc/8SCY-8H3F] (defining “event” as “something that happens,”
“occurrence,” and “a noteworthy happening”); Occurrence, AHDICTIONARY, https://ahdictionary.
com/word/search.html?q=occurrence [https://perma.cc/2TKV-GNT6] (defining “occurrence” as
“the action, fact, or instance of occurring” and as “something that takes place; an event or incident”);
Occurrence,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/occurrence
[https://perma.cc/V64D-REJ3] (defining “occurrence” as “something that occurs” or “the action or
fact of happening or occurring”); Occurrence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining
“occurrence” as “something that occurs,” “the action or instance of occurring” or “[s]omething that
happens or takes place,” including a “continuing condition that results in personal injury or property
damage.”).
175. Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P, 719 F.3d 270, 277 (3d Cir. 2013);
Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., 760 F.3d 405, 412–13 (5th Cir. 2014); Spencer
v. Specialty Foundry Prods. Inc., 953 F.3d 735, 743 (11th Cir. 2020).
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reading of the words.176 As such the Ninth Circuit interpretation is too
narrow and should be abandoned.177
D. Adopting the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Interpretations
The Fifth Circuit’s view, established in Rainbow Gun Club and later
adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in Spencer, is the most acceptable
interpretation of an “event or occurrence.” The Fifth Circuit agreed with
the Third Circuit in Abraham that an “event or occurrence” is not limited to
a single moment in time.178 However, the Fifth Circuit held that the Third
Circuit’s interpretation is too broad because it is overly inclusive and gives
courts considerable discretion.179 The Fifth Circuit used the Abraham
interpretation and added limitations to establish an interpretation that was
easy for courts to apply.180 The Fifth Circuit held that an “event or
occurrence” could include events occurring at a single moment in time and
events “contextually connected, which when completed, create[] one event
consistent with the ordinary understanding and the legislative history of the
exclusion.”181 This interpretation adds words of limitation and will guide
courts in applying the exception. Unlike the vague “some commonality”
language used by the Third Circuit, this interpretation reveals how much
“commonality” must exist to qualify as an “event or occurrence.”182
Further, this interpretation limits the broad judicial discretion given by the
Third Circuit by restricting the exception to events that are “contextually
connected” and “create a related event.”183 Thus, by narrowing the Third
176. See Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277 (“In common parlance, neither the term ‘event’ nor
‘occurrence’ is used solely to refer to a specific incident that can be definitively limited to an
ascertainable period of minutes, hours, or days.”); Rainbow Gun Club, 760 F.3d at 409 (“Nothing in
either definition imposes a simultaneous time limitation, and BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY explicitly
defines ‘occurrence’ as including a continuing condition.”); Spencer, 953 F.3d at 740–41 (“Based on
these definitions, we think that the phrase ‘event or occurrence’ is broad enough to include a solitary
happening that occurs in a single moment in time and (in some cases at least) a continuing set of related
circumstances.”).
177. See Werner, supra note 37, at 483 (“An interpretation of a statute is inappropriate if it
overlooks the purpose of the act.”).
178. Rainbow Gun Club, 760 F.3d at 412–13.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 413; see also Myers, supra note 114, at 198–99 (discussing how the Fifth Circuit’s
interpretation includes “events contextually connected and when completed, create a related event”).
182. Rainbow Gun Club, 760 F.3d at 413.
183. Id. (“[A]n ongoing pattern of conduct . . . contextually connected, which when completed
created one event consistent with the ordinary understanding and the legislative history of the
exclusion.”).
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Circuit approach, the Fifth Circuit provides guidelines to limit a court’s
discretion in applying the exception.184 The interpretation also serves to
prevent the inclusion of happenings that are too separate in time or only
share “some commonality,” such as a common source.
Further, the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation best conforms to the legislative
intent of CAFA because the drafters intended the exception to be limited to
cases that states would have an interest in adjudicating.185 This
interpretation will only remand cases where the event happened at a discrete
moment in time, or events that are so connected as to create one big event.
This guarantees that the exception will apply to events and harms that are
truly local, and thus, in the state’s interest to adjudicate.
It should also be acknowledged that the Ninth Circuit favors the Fifth
Circuit interpretation over the Third Circuit Interpretation.186 The Allen
court explicitly rejected the interpretation of the Third Circuit,187but held
the interpretation in Rainbow Gun Club did not necessarily contradict the
interpretation of the Ninth Circuit.188 The Allen court explained that,
although the alleged misconduct in Rainbow Gun Club occurred over
different periods in time, the misconduct led to a single happening—the
failure of a well.189 Since the failure of the well in Rainbow Gun Club
happened at a discrete moment in time, the interpretation and facts of
Rainbow Gun Club were not at odds with the Ninth Circuit interpretation.190
Although the Rainbow Gun Club opinion has been recognized as the most
reasonable circuit interpretation, it has been scrutinized as unclear or

184. Lafalier v. Cinnabar Serv. Co., Inc., No. 10–CV–0005–CVE–TLW, 2010 WL 1486900,
at *4 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 13, 2010).
185. See generally Myers, supra note 114, at 176–78 (examining the history and legislative intent
of CAFA).
186. See Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 630, 633 (9th Cir. 2015) (“With due respect to the
Third Circuit, we do not agree with its definition of ‘event or occurrence’ as that term is used in
CAFA.”); White v. Bastrop Energy Partners LP, No. CV H-21-870, 2021 WL 4295320, at *5 (S.D.
Tex. Sept. 21, 2021) (“Although the Ninth Circuit rejected the Third Circuit’s approach in Abraham as
too broad, it was more open to the Fifth Circuit’s approach in Rainbow Gun Club.”)
187. See Allen, 784 F.3d at 630 (“However, even were we free to interpret the phrase as we
would, we would not adopt the Third Circuit’s approach.”).
188. See id. at 633 (“The Fifth Circuit’s approach is neither helpful to Plaintiffs nor necessarily
contrary to Nevada . . . .”).
189. See id. (“The case before the Fifth Circuit concerned a single ‘event or occurrence,’ the
failure of a well, although the precise timing of the failure was not clear.”).
190. See id. (“[T]he Fifth Circuit noted that the spill ‘resulted from a number of individual
negligent acts related to each other, all of which came together to culminate in the single event.’”).
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incapable of easy application.191 This criticism is based on the fact that the
Rainbow Gun Club court established its interpretation without explaining how
courts should apply it.192 However, this criticism came before the Eleventh
Circuit’s interpretation in Spencer.193 The Spencer opinion is essential in
analyzing what qualifies as “contextually connected events” under the Fifth
Circuit interpretation.194 The Spencer court explains that “contextually
connected events” are a “series of connected, harm-causing incidents that
culminate in one event or occurrence giving rise to plaintiffs’ claims.”195
The Spencer court explains that different parties may commit the alleged
misconduct or underlying acts, the parties may act independently and
separately in committing the alleged misconduct or underlying acts, and the
underlying acts may be committed during different periods of time, as long
as that conduct “culminat[es] [in one] harm causing event.”196 The Spencer
court uses the facts from Adams v. International Paper Company to demonstrate
what constitutes “contextually connected events.”197 The Spencer court
explains that the defendants in Adams committed two different underlying
acts during different time periods: one defendant released the pollutants and
the other defendant “exacerbated the release of those same pollutants.”198
These two acts came together to form “a continuous release of particular
pollutants.”199 The Spencer and Adams courts held that under the Fifth
Circuit interpretation, these acts were sufficiently connected to cause the
pollution, which qualified as one “culminating harm causing event.”200
The Spencer opinion uses the facts from its own case to show what will not
constitute “contextually related events” causing one “culminating harm191. See Myers, supra note 114, at 200 (“Although the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits and the
drafters of the CAFA took a step in the right direction by trying to prevent the corruption that is
characteristically present in mass actions, a clear standard must be created for the single local event
exception and the same event or occurrence requirement.”).
192. C.f. id. (acknowledging the Fifth Circuit has the best interpretation, but argues the
interpretation is insufficient to meet the needs of mass environmental torts).
193. See id. at 201–02, 206 (creating a SORT Test as a resolution to the circuit split before the
Spencer opinion).
194. See White v. Bastrop Energy Partners LP, No. CV H-21-870, 2021 WL 4295320, at *5
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2021) (“The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Spencer . . . is helpful in analyzing
‘contextually connected’ events.”).
195. Spencer v. Specialty Foundry Prods. Inc., 953 F.3d 735, 740 (11th Cir. 2020).
196. Id. at 743.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See id. (comparing the case facts to other cases with a culminating harm-causing event);
Adams v. Int’l Paper Co., No. CV 17-0105-WS-B, 2017 WL 1828908, at *3 (S.D. Ala. May 5, 2017).
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causing event.”201 In Spencer, there was no single harm causing event as in
Adams because the defendant released harmful chemicals used by the
foundry workers in different ways and caused the workers different harms
over a twenty-year period.202 The Spencer court held that different harms
over a twenty-year period cannot be considered a “culminating harm causing
event.”203
The Spencer opinion is essential to fully understanding the Fifth Circuit
interpretation and has aided courts in applying the interpretation.204
Ultimately, Courts should adopt this interpretation as a uniform standard
because it best conforms to the legislative intent of CAFA, is not overly
inclusive, and provides guidelines that will render consistent results across
circuits.
V. CONCLUSION
Recently, the Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted
the vague language in CAFA’s local single event exception.205 However,
these circuits failed to agree on one interpretation, thereby creating a threeway circuit split on the issue.206 Courts disfavor circuit splits because they
cause wide-ranging issues such as inconsistent outcomes, inequitable results,
and forum shopping.207 To avoid these issues, courts should adopt a clear

201. Spencer, 953 F.3d at 743.
202. Id. at 737–38.
203. Id. at 743.
204. See White v. Bastrop Energy Partners LP, No. CV H-21-870, 2021 WL 4295320, at *5–7
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2021) (using the Spencer opinion to apply the Fifth Circuit interpretation to its
own facts).
205. See Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P, 719 F.3d 270, 279 (3d Cir. 2013)
(interpretating the vague “event or occurrence” language of the local single event exception); Nevada
v. Bank of America, 672 F.3d 661, 668 (9th Cir. 2012) (interpreting the “event or occurrence language);
Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 637 (9th Cir. 2015) (approving the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation);
Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., 760 F.3d 405, 413–14 (5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting
the interpretation of the “event or occurrence” language of the Third and Ninth Circuits); Spencer,
953 F.3d at 740–41 (accepting the interpretation adopted in Rainbow Gun Club).
206. See Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277–80 (adopting an interpretation that contradicts with the
Ninth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits); Nevada, 672 F.3d at 668 (adopting an interpretation that
contradicts with the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits); Allen, 784 F.3d at 637 (adopting an
interpretation that contradicts with the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits); Rainbow Gun Club, 760 F.3d
at 413–14 (adopting an interpretation that contradicts with the Third and Ninth Circuits); Spencer,
953 F.3d at 740–41 (adopting an interpretation that contradicts with the Third and Ninth Circuits).
207. See Myers, supra note 114, at 206 (discussing the problems created by local single event
exception circuit split); Moyer, supra note 62, at 831 (discussing common problems created by circuit
splits).
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and uniform standard to evaluate what constitutes an “event or occurrence”
under CAFA.208 The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation in Allen is too narrow
to conform to the exception’s legislative intent.209 Further, the Ninth
Circuit interpretation contradicts several general and legal definitions of the
words “event or occurrence.”210
Although the Third Circuit’s
interpretation conforms to the ordinary meaning of the terms “event or
occurrence,” the interpretation is too broad and gives judges too much
discretion in applying the exception.211 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuit’s
adopted an interpretation that appropriately narrows the interpretation of
the Third Circuit.212 This interpretation holds that an “event or
occurrence” could include a happening at a single moment in time and
events “contextually connected . . . to culminate in one, distinct harmcausing event or occurrence.”213 Courts should adopt this interpretation
as a uniform standard because it best conforms to the legislative intent of
CAFA and provides guidelines that will render consistent results across the
circuit courts.

208. Joseph F. Weis, Jr., The Case for Appellate Court Revision, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1269 (1995)
(acknowledging the courts lack “federal law uniformity”).
209. Myers, supra note 114, at 197 (arguing the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation is too narrow, and
courts should not adopt it).
210. See Spencer, 953 F.3d at 740–41 (examining several popular legal and popular dictionaries
to prove the Allen interpretation does not follow the ordinary meaning of the terms “event or
occurrence”).
211. See Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., 760 F.3d 405, 413 (5th Cir. 2014)
(refusing to adopt the Third Circuit interpretation); Spencer, 953 F.3d at 742 (arguing the Third Circuit
interpretation is too inclusive).
212. See generally Rainbow Gun Club, 760 F.3d at 405 (adopting an interpretation narrowing the
Third Circuit’s interpretation); Spencer, 953 F.3d at 735 (adopting the interpretation of the Fifth Circuit).
213. Spencer, 953 F.3d at 742.
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